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Introduction  
 
Terrorism is seemingly omnipresent in our society. In recent years, the phenomenon 
has clawed its way into our daily lives and subsequently forced itself upon many national and 
international agendas. More often than not, acts of terrorism are depicted as erratic and 
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Abstract 
At present, the issue of leaving terrorism behind is a widely discussed but poorly 
understood subject. When compared to the extensive body of literature on the 
process of radicalization, research on terrorist desistance is both theoretically and 
conceptually lagging behind. As a consequence, policy makers and practitioners 
are currently operating in a theoretical vacuum. This article aims to address the 
pressing need for a better understanding of the discontinuance of terrorism by 
introducing a social identity perspective to the existing field of re-search. Social 
identity can be understood as the part of an individual’s self-concept that is 
derived from membership within personally relevant social groups. As such, the 
concept of social identity is vital to making sense of the identity transformation 
intrinsic to walking away from terrorism. Exploring the role of social identity in 
terrorist desistance gives prominence to the intersection between the individual 
and the social group. Framing terrorist dis-continuance as a process that emanates 
from the interface between individual and group-level mechanisms corresponds to 
the interactive nature of rebuilding a life after terrorism. Additionally, the 
explanatory value of a social identity perspective has already been demonstrated 
in the field of radicalisation research. Extending this theoretical framework to the 
subject of terrorist desistance enables us to connect the dots between two 
processes that are inherently linked, though frequently analysed as isolated 
entities. 
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appalling outbursts of violence. The unique combination of theatricality, bloodshed and 
apparent irrationality continues to baffle the general public. Terrorism raises many questions 
and has consequently inspired a spate of scientific research into the subject. In order to make 
sense of the senseless, much effort has been devoted to laying bare the roots of politicized 
violence. However, understanding the causes of terrorist activity is only half the picture. 
Terrorist involvement not only comes into being, at some point this engagement comes to an 
end (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009). Yet the opposite end of the terrorist life cycle has been far less 
extensively examined (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Mullins, 2010; Windisch, Simi, Ligon, & 
McNeel, 2016). Strictly speaking, this issue has only been gaining academic momentum since 
2009 (Windisch, Simi, Ligon, & McNeel, 2016), following two influential publications by 
Horgan (2009) and Bjorgo and Horgan (2009). 
Despite this surge of interest, the field of terrorist discontinuance remains both 
conceptually and theoretically underdeveloped. As for the terminology, the concepts of 
disengagement and deradicalization have been the subject of swelling criticism (Clubb, 2015; 
Marsden, 2016; Lynch, 2015). In lieu of these ill-defined terms, the present article opts for the 
all-embracing notion of desistance from terrorism. Even though this concept is anything but 
undisputed (Bushway & Paternoster, 2014), the added value of using desistance as a point of 
reference lies in the fact that the term favours a multidimensional, comprehensive and 
processual appreciation of the phenomenon at hand (Lynch, 2015; Bubolz & Simi, 2015). For 
the purposes of this article, the term desistance is taken to mean “a long-term abstinence from 
crime among individuals who had previously engaged in persistent patterns of criminal 
offending. The focus here is not on the transition or change, but rather on the maintenance of 
crime-free behavior in the face of life’s obstacles and frustrations” (Maruna, 2001, p. 26). 
The crime in question is not confined to acts of politicized violence, but includes the 
supporting activities that make terrorist violence possible (Lynch, 2015). Regarding the 
theorization of terrorist discontinuance, a coherent theoretical framework is still a long way 
off (Glazzard, 2017; Marsden, 2016; Clubb, 2015). As concerns the question of desistance 
from terrorism, unmistakable progress has been made over the past decade. However, it is 
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apparent that the present theoretical endeavours only scratch the surface of the problem 
(Harris, 2015; Marsden, 2016). What we know, or think we know, about abandoning terrorist 
commitments is more or less fragmentary and desperately calls for further elaboration. In 
short, the pursuit of a solid theoretical foundation would definitely benefit the field.  
In order to deepen our understanding of the process, a social identity approach to the 
issue of terrorist desistance is put forth. The social identity perspective is commonly 
recognized as a long-standing and universal frame of reference. The indicated research 
tradition has been empirically validated and replicated in many different contexts (Spears, 
2011). Moreover, the social identity approach has a considerable record of performance in 
shedding new light on theoretical propositions (Hornsey, 2008). Generally speaking, our 
understanding of the role of identity in the process of desisting from terrorism is rather limited 
(Dean, 2017; Barrelle, 2010). This runs contrary to recent developments in the literature on 
desistance from crime (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; Bushway & Paternoster, 
2014; Paternoster & Bushway, 2009) and to the application of identity issues to the study of 
terrorist involvement (Simi, Bubolz, & Hardman, 2013; Barrelle, 2010). Accordingly, this 
article aims to address this hiatus by viewing what we know about terrorist desistance through 
the prism of social identity. 
 
The Terrorist Endgame: A State of the Art 
 
In recent years, the issue of parting ways from a life of terrorism has amassed a 
significant scholarly audience (Windisch, Simi, Ligon, & McNeel, 2016). Despite this ever 
expanding interest, our comprehension of how one comes to give up terrorist involvement is 
still in a nascent state. An assessment of this relatively young field of inquiry reveals that two 
themes run as connecting threads throughout this scholarly niche, namely the debate between 
deradicalization and disengagement and the push-pull framework. 
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Disengagement and Deradicalization 
To begin with, the distinction between disengagement and deradicalization is a 
defining feature of the field. That is, the monolithic notion of terrorist discontinuance is 
analytically split up in cognitive and behavioural subprocesses (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009). The 
term disengagement typically refers to behavioural aspects associated with stepping down 
from terrorism (Windisch, Simi, Ligon, & McNeel, 2016; Schuurman & Bakker, 2016; 
Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). Deradicalization, on the other hand, principally 
concerns the cognitive dimension of this process (Entenmann, van der Heide, Weggemans, & 
Dorsey, 2015; Harris, 2015; Schuurman & Bakker, 2016). Although apparently 
straightforward, this terminological divide has proven to be a great source of confusion in the 
field of research. First of all, both terms have been delineated in a number of different ways. 
For instance, concepts such as attitudes (Clubb, 2015), values (Bubolz & Simi, 2015), beliefs 
(Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010) or psychological disengagement (Barrelle, 2010) 
are stockpiled under an all-purpose conceptualization of deradicalization. On top of that, the 
same term is also used to describe the complete process of leaving terrorism behind, 
encompassing both behavioural and cognitive dimensions (Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 
2008) or even to label attempts aimed at preventing radicalization, essentially confounding 
policy and process (Schmid, 2013; Clubb, 2015). In addition, the concept of deradicalization 
is built on shaky foundations, given that the process of radicalization is, in itself, an ill-
defined and disputed term (Berger, 2016; Bötticher, 2017; Sageman, 2017). Not only is the 
definition of deradicalization and disengagement remarkably fuzzy, the terms are also used 
interchangeably and inconsistently (Glazzard, 2017; Lynch, 2015; Bubolz & Simi, 2015). The 
terminology is further muddled by the adoption of various other constructs (Marsden, 2016), 
such as defection (Bubolz & Simi, 2015), deprogramming (Schmid, 2013) or reintegration 
and rehabilitation (Marsden, 2016). Consequently, the research field finds itself in a 
permanent state of terminological disarray, rendering its own concepts 
effectively meaningless. 
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This inadequate conceptualisation, as sketched above, has not kept the distinction 
between disengagement and deradicalization from profoundly influencing the field. Teasing 
apart the cognitive and behavioural components of separating oneself from terrorist 
involvement has sparked the question which of the two dimensions matters most in preventing 
re-engagement (van der Heide & Huurman, 2016; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). 
This to-ing and fro-ing about the relative importance of deradicalization and disengagement 
has also been requalified as the attitudes-behaviour debate (Clubb, 2015). Proponents of the 
idea of disengagement argue that changing behaviour takes primacy over changing beliefs, on 
account of violence being the bottom-line problem (Berger, 2016). Furthermore, it is claimed 
that the renunciation of violence does not depend upon the rejection of ideas or worldviews 
that justify terrorist activity (Schuurman & Bakker, 2016; Schmid, 2013; Clubb, 2015). 
Advocates of deradicalization nevertheless maintain that the abandonment of extremist beliefs 
is imperative to “permanently defuse the threat posed by these individuals” (Rabasa, 
Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010, p. xiv). Settling for behavioural change runs the risk that, 
under different circumstances, disengaged militants chose to pick up the thread where they 
previously left it (La Palm, 2017). 
All things considered, the attitudes-behaviour debate has failed to engage with the 
concepts of deradicalization and disengagement in a way that enriches our understanding of 
either construct. The discussion focuses exclusively on what sets both dimensions apart 
(Clubb, 2015). Accordingly, what ties both processes together is a notable blind spot in this 
field of research (Harris, 2015; Windisch, Simi, Ligon, & McNeel, 2016). What is more, the 
distinction is furnished with assumptions about the causal relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour essentially framing terrorist desistance as a process that either hinges completely on 
a change in beliefs or is altogether disconnected from a shift in attitudes. Reality is, per 
contra, more nuanced than this (Clubb, 2015). The current conceptualisation and subsequent 
compartmentalization of terrorist discontinuance, though not strictly adhered to by each and 
every scholar (see for instance Horgan, 2009), does in fact shape our view of how the process 
takes place. By the same token, this imperfect representation feeds back into the assessment 
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of what effective interventions should look like. A case in point is the implicit assumption that 
guides a number of deradicalization programmes. That is, interventions aimed at explicitly 
deradicalizing individuals presuppose that violent beliefs give rise to violent deeds and, 
accordingly, adjusting these corruptive beliefs will bring about a change in behaviour 
(Marsden, 2016; Bubolz & Simi, 2015; Clubb, 2015). Put differently, the argument 
supporting this type of intervention amounts to nothing more than reasoning in a circle 
between radicalization and deradicalization (Lynch, 2015). The assumed causality between 
attitudes and acts in either direction is simply ungrounded (Ferguson, 2016). A final reminder 
of the improper conceptualisation in this research domain is the reductionist nature of the term 
deradicalization in particular, “which (…) positions the ‘problem’ in the head of the 
individual” (Marsden, 2016, p. 10) without further regard for situational or social aspects (de 
Graaf & Weggemans, 2016). 
 
The Push-Pull Framework 
The second line of inquiry that currently defines the field is the push-pull framework. 
In essence, the model envisions the decision to retire from a terrorist group as a function of 
push and pull factors (Schuurman & Bakker, 2016). Push factors induce aversion against 
terrorist involvement, whereas pull factors underscore the alluring features of a life beyond 
militancy (Schuurman & Bakker, 2016; van der Heide & Huurman, 2016; La Palm, 2017). 
This interpretation of the disengagement process was first introduced in the work of Aho 
(1988). More recently, the framework has been further developed by Bjorgo and Horgan 
(2009). The model by Altier and colleagues (2014) now stands as the leading frame of 
reference in the field (van der Heide & Huurman, 2016; La Palm, 2017).  
As follows, the research on terrorist desistance has been primarily absorbed by the 
question “what moves an individual to break away from terrorism?” (Harris, 2015; van der 
Heide & Huurman, 2016). A systematic review of the literature on disengagement by 
Windisch and colleagues (2016) has revealed that violence, disillusionment and actual 
confinement or the threat thereof are the most frequently cited push factors, whereas social 
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relationships, employment and education embody the most prevailing pull factors. 
Disillusionment, above all, is marked as a recurrent theme in the research (La Palm, 2017; 
Harris, 2015; Dean, 2017). Furthermore, it is generally recognized that the decision to 
disengage does not rest on one argument, but is de facto connected to a number of 
considerations (Barrelle, 2015; Schuurman & Bakker, 2016; Horgan, Altier, Shortland, & 
Taylor, 2017). Various factors that either endorse a prolonged membership or push for leave-
taking are weighed up against each other in a crude cost-benefit analysis (Harris, 2015; 
Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). The decision to disengage is additionally shaped 
by the presence of acceptable alternatives and the size of the costs sunk into terrorist 
involvement (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; Horgan, Altier, Shortland, & Taylor, 
2017). As yet, the relative weight of each of these factors in the decision-making process is 
largely uncharted (Harris, 2015). The finding that push factors are typically more decisive 
than pull factors has nevertheless been reiterated in several studies (van der Heide & 
Huurman, 2016; La Palm, 2017). However, one should not downplay the role of pull factors 
in the decision to give up terrorism (Windisch, Simi, Ligon, & McNeel, 2016). Without a 
viable alternative for terrorist engagement, choosing to terminate one’s membership is 
anything but a clear-cut matter (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014). 
As a theoretical point of departure, the push-pull model carries much weight within 
this research domain (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014). The framework is of particular 
use in tracing back the reasons why an individual decides to walk away from terrorism (see 
Horgan, Altier, Shortland, & Taylor, 2017). Moreover, through the push-pull model, the field 
has come to understand the turn away from terrorist activity as a product of agency (Marsden, 
2016). However, the framework falls flat when it comes to providing a comprehensive 
theoretical explanation for terrorist desistance. Specifically, the push-pull model is but a 
descriptive and superficial account of a multifaceted and deep-rooted process (Altier, 
Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014). The cognitive mechanisms that underlie this form of self-
change are gravely overlooked and even reduced to a paradigm of rational, machinelike 
deliberation (Harris, 2015; Lynch, 2015; Bubolz & Simi, 2015). On top of that, the decision to 
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disengage is a highly idiosyncratic matter, meaning that the causes identified in one case are 
not necessarily relevant to any other individual (Harris, 2015; Altier, Thoroughgood, & 
Horgan, 2014). Considering this limited transferability, the factors that are stated in this 
framework are by no means universal (Marsden, 2016). Moreover, disengagement or 
physically leaving the group is deemed to be the end of the line (Simi, Blee, DeMichele, & 
Windisch, 2017; Harris, 2015). As a result, success is in effect equated to the absence of 
conflict (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). Whether the individual subsequently manages 
to reintegrate peacefully into society is of no further concern (Marsden, 2016). Yet merely 
putting down the AK-47 and going home is a far cry from a complete process of desistance. 
As mentioned above, desistance is as much about sustaining the decision to turn one’s life 
around as it is about terminating violent behaviour (Harris, 2015; Marsden, 2016). 
In light of these limitations, a number of studies have moved beyond the push-pull 
framework. The most prominent examples are the Pro-Integration Model by Barrelle (2015) 
and the grounded theory of psychological disengagement by Harris (2015). As these 
theoretical advancements indicate, the research domain at hand is in a constant state of flux. 
Over the years, the field has gradually progressed from building theories from scratch tailored 
to the question of terrorist discontinuance (see Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008) to 
bringing more general, pre-existing theories into play (see Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 
2014; Williams & Lindsey, 2014). On the whole, the field is progressively stepping back from 
terrorist exceptionalism (Marsden, 2016). In preference to construing terrorist involvement as 
anomalous behaviour that calls for anomalous explanations (Dean, 2017), terrorist 
engagement and desistance are interpreted as extraordinary phenomena that are grounded in 
ordinary processes. 
Thus far, this relatively young field has raised more questions than answers. What we 
currently know about desistance from terrorism is heavily coloured by both the push-pull 
model and the distinction between deradicalization and disengagement. As argued earlier, the 
terms used to describe the discontinuance of terrorism are living a life of their own. Likewise, 
the push-pull framework is a depthless explanation of the cessation of terrorist involvement. 
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Given the present state of knowledge, the field conveys a rather distorted image of the process 
of terrorist discontinuation. In order to broaden our understanding of desisting from terrorism 
and to flesh out the theoretical frames presented above, the following section turns to a well-
established research tradition: the social identity approach. 
 
The Social Identity Approach: An Overview 
 
As the name suggests, the social identity perspective spans not one, but an assortment 
of related theories that are firmly rooted in the discipline of social psychology (Reicher, 
Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Intergroup processes and social-psychological effects of group 
membership are at the very heart of this research tradition (Sindic & Condor, 2014), thereby 
placing itself right at the intersection between the individual and the group. The social identity 
approach emerged in response to perceived tendencies in the field of social psychology to 
examine processes that unfold between groups from an individualistic perspective (Hornsey, 
2008; Spears, 2011). Dating back to the early seventies, the social identity perspective is first 
and foremost a longstanding research tradition that has greatly influenced our understanding 
of group-related phenomena and continues to do so up to this day (Hornsey, 2008; McKeown, 
Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Sindic & Condor, 2014). The principles of social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory are set out hereafter. 
 
Social Identity Theory 
The somewhat elusive phenomenon of social identity is broken down by two 
prominent theories: social identity theory and self-categorization theory. Social identity theory 
is primarily concerned with intergroup processes (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Hogg, 
Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004), whereas self-categorization theory centres around the 
intragroup and intra-individual side of the process (Hornsey, 2008). The latter will be 
discussed later on. 
  
 
 
 
 
Sigrid Raets: Considering Terrorist Desistance from a Social Identity Perspective. 
 
 
 
 
10 
Henri Tajfel, principal architect of the social identity theory, has described social 
identity as “an individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with 
some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership” (McKeown, Haji, & 
Ferguson, 2016). Social identity, as opposed to personal identity, is the result of processes of 
social identification and social categorization (Spears, 2011). Social categorization refers to 
the fact that individuals categorize people into groups based on the characteristics they share 
as a way to catalogue the world around them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These different groups 
are in turn stacked up against each other by their respective members in a process of social 
comparison (Spears, 2011). Along these lines, we characterize the groups we belong to, and 
which subsequently become a part of how we define ourselves, by contrasting them with other 
groups (Spears, 2011; Hornsey, 2008). 
Social identification is thus what ties individuals to the social groups of which they are 
a part (Spears, 2011). Aside from bolstering group membership, social categorization and 
social comparison processes also bear meaning in a very different way. As made evident by 
the minimal group paradigm, the sole fact of being sorted into different categories is sufficient 
to provoke antagonism between these groups (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). In other 
words, social identification transforms how we define ourselves as well as how we define 
others (Hornsey, 2008). 
What exactly drives people to engage in social identity processes is quite the bone of 
contention. Concerning the motivational aspect of social identity, the self-esteem hypothesis 
entails that social comparisons that favour the own group over a relevant out-group reinforces 
the associated social identity, thereby effectively enhancing self-esteem (Spears, 2011; 
McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Deaux, 1993). The optimal distinctiveness theory, on the 
other hand, argues that a positive social identity fulfils the basic human need of belonging 
while at the same time permitting the individual to retain a certain sense of uniqueness 
(Spears, 2011; Hornsey, 2008; Sindic & Condor, 2014). Lastly, the uncertainty-identity theory 
postulates that individuals resort to processes of social categorization as a means of 
countering existential uncertainty (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Hogg, 2007).  
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Social identity theory, however, does not assume collective identities to be 
axiomatically satisfactory. In spite of appearance, social identity is deep down a theory of 
social change (Spears, 2011; Hornsey, 2008). Negative social comparisons can elicit disparate 
reactions from individuals (Sindic & Condor, 2014; Jenkins, 2014). If the boundaries between 
the damaged in-group and a more favourable out-group are perceived as traversable, the 
individual could opt to leave one collectivity for another in a process termed social mobility 
(Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Sindic & Condor, 
2014). When swapping sides is beyond the bounds of possibility, one could commit oneself to 
direct social competition with a view to changing the status quo (Spears, 2011; Reicher, 
Spears, & Haslam, 2010; Sindic & Condor, 2014). Alternatively, the individual is left with the 
option of social creativity, which involves warping the social comparison process to a more 
positive outcome by adjusting the points of comparison (Spears, 2011; McKeown, Haji, & 
Ferguson, 2016; Sindic & Condor, 2014).  
 
Self-Categorization Theory 
As mentioned before, self-categorization theory examines how social identity lodges 
itself both within and between the minds of individuals (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; 
Hornsey, 2008). First off, self-categorization implies a process of self-stereotyping that is 
essentially the cognitive counterpart of the intergroup mechanisms described by social 
identity theory (Deaux, 1993; Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004). In pursuance of making 
this bewildering world somewhat more understandable, individuals mentally represent social 
categories as a myopic set of attributes, otherwise known as a prototype (Jenkins, 2014; 
McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). If this mental image is held in common by the greater 
part of a social group, the prototype assumes the form of a stereotype (Hogg, 2014; 
McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). Stereotypes, or preconceived notions about social 
categories, are subsequently internalised by the individual (Jenkins, 2014). Specifically, 
people strive to fit the pattern set out by their own group stereotypes (Reicher, Spears, & 
Haslam, 2010). In other words, the group has a shared understanding of what they are like and 
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members that identify with the group seek to match this image (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 
2016). This process of self-stereotyping or incorporating group-level definitions within one’s 
sense of self eventually culminates into a state of depersonalization. This entails that, on 
average, the self is more readily described in terms of group membership (Baray, Postmes, & 
Jetten, 2009; Sindic & Condor, 2014). Consequently, people experience themselves as 
interchangeable with other members rather than as distinct individuals (Spears, 2011; Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994; Stets & Burke, 2000).  
Depersonalization is thus typified by a shift in salience between personal and social 
identities (Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994). 
Identity salience, as such, is determined by the accessibility of the identity in question and its 
relative “fit” to the surrounding world (Spears, 2011; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 
1994). Accessibility refers to the inclination of an individual to adopt a specific social 
category and is in itself a function of preceding experiences and prevailing motives and 
expectations (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994; Sindic & Condor, 2014). Fit, on the 
other hand, concerns the link between a given social identity and the individual’s perception 
of reality (Sindic & Condor, 2014). Social categorizations that are high in comparative fit are 
those that magnify the differences between the out-group and the in-group while minimizing 
the differences within the group (Spears, 2011; Hornsey, 2008). This foundation for identity 
salience is also known as the meta-contrast principle (Spears, 2011; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, 
& McGarthy, 1994). The second type of fit, normative fit, indicates the degree of consistency 
between the content of a certain social identity and one’s personal beliefs about the facts of 
existence (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994; Spears, 2011).  
Moreover, processes of self-categorization and identity salience are far from static. 
Identity is, so to speak, at the mercy of the social environments in which it subsists (Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994). As long as contexts change, identities will change with 
them in order to reflect the individual’s altering relationship to reality. On that account, 
individuals self-categorize differently in keeping with the various situations that come to pass 
(Jenkins, 2014; Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004). In fact, any person has a number of 
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meaningful identities, both personal and social, at his or her disposal that continuously go up 
against each other in a ceaseless game of relevance delineated by the present context 
(Sageman, 2017). 
Lastly, self-categorization touches upon the subject of social influence (Spears, 2011). 
The concept of referent informational influence denotes that within a certain group, 
individuals look to its most prototypical members for directions on the group’s norms and 
expectations (Spears, 2011; McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Sageman, 2017). Normative 
behaviour can thus be regarded as an expression of social identity (McKeown, Haji, & 
Ferguson, 2016; Stets & Burke, 2000). Correspondently, conformity is the curious emanation 
of both the socialisation and internalisation of collective norms, stemming from making group 
standards one’s own rather than bulldozing people into compliance (McKeown, Haji, & 
Ferguson, 2016; Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004). Seeing that social influence operates 
primarily through self-categorization, influence is limited to norms and behaviour that are 
perceived as compatible with the group’s stereotype (Sindic & Condor, 2014; Reicher, Spears, 
& Haslam, 2010). In addition, adhering to group norms over an extended period of time can 
crystallize into a form of automatic cognition or habitual decision making (Harris, 2015; Simi, 
Blee, DeMichele, & Windisch, 2017). 
 
Social Identity and Terrorism: A Tale of Threat and Defence 
 
Social Identity and the Pathway Towards Terrorism 
Considering that social identity theory is principally a theory of social change and 
collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hornsey, 2008), making the leap to terrorist activity 
is hardly far-fetched. As a matter of fact, the social identity perspective has been hailed as a 
valuable frame of reference in explaining the turn to terrorist involvement (Barrelle, 2010; 
Sageman, 2017; Doosje, et al., 2016). The emergence of terrorism is, quite literally, entangled 
in processes of social identification and self-categorization. After all, “only those who identify 
together can mobilize together” (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008, p. 1328). 
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Group-level psychological processes are key in understanding why individuals revert 
to politicized violence (Doosje, et al., 2016). Terrorist groups are generally formed at the very 
outskirts of society. Through processes of social comparison, people on the fringes find each 
other in a shared sense of frustration (Sageman, 2017; Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, 
& Webber, 2017). In line with the meta-contrast principle described by self-categorization 
theory, these individuals become aware that they resemble each other in terms of their 
frustrated needs more than they recognize themselves in the rest of the general public 
(Sageman, 2017). And so, a social group that defines itself in direct opposition to 
conventional society develops. This demarcation of what we are and what we are not induces 
further processes of social identification and subsequent self-categorization. Evidently, the 
formation of an oppositional group provokes a certain reaction from the community, more 
often than not in the form of outside categorization. As outlined by social identity theory, how 
a collectivity defines itself and how a collectivity is defined by the out-group are firmly 
interclasped processes (Jenkins, 2014). The group’s collective identity is therefore heavily 
influenced by societal backlash. Consequently, the group embarks on a quest to legitimize 
itself (Berger, 2017). Deepened identification with the in-group goes hand in hand with a 
heightened dis-identification with the out-group, which effectively grows into a practice of 
delegitimizing the other category (Berger, 2017; Ingram, 2016). The moment the out-group is 
perceived as a threat to the in-group, this interdependent process of identity construction 
reaches a critical point (Berger, 2017; Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). A vision of crisis is 
erected from pre-existing feelings of grievance, for which the out-group is held responsible 
(Ingram, 2016). Most often, a threatened identity is a particularly salient identity (Sageman, 
2017; McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016), prompting these individuals to further latch on to 
their social identities. This grim representation of the out-group is starkly juxtaposed with a 
downright praiseful definition of the in-group (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, & 
Webber, 2017). A collectivity that is thus typified by purity and virtue is by all means worthy 
of protection (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Aggravating constructs of threat, vulnerability 
and crisis are eventually met with constructs that propagate violent solutions (Berger, 2017). 
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Given the perceived level of threat that is posed by the out-group, the survival of the in-group 
necessitates taking the offensive (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Ultimately, the escalation 
from the acquisition of a certain social identity to a do-or-die situation that calls for a reign of 
terror is entwined with the context in which it takes place (Sageman, 2017). As such, the 
phenomenon of terrorism stems directly from the interweaving between individual and 
collectivity, embedded in an iterative process that feeds off the reaction of the out-group 
(Sageman, 2017). In short, the key mechanism in becoming a terrorist is to be found in a shift 
in salience from a more personal to a more social identity (Sageman, 2017; Barrelle, 2010; 
Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009). 
Identity, on top of providing the means for terrorist engagement, is a powerful 
motivating force when it comes to getting oneself involved in the first place. Several identity 
motives have been pointed out throughout the literature on radicalization. First, feelings of 
self-uncertainty could draw people to terrorist groups given that they are undeniably capable 
of providing someone with a clear-cut identity (Hogg, 2014). In the same way, terrorist 
involvement can be seen as the answer to deep-seated identity discrepancies (Simi, Bubolz, & 
Hardman, 2013).  Moreover, membership of a terrorist organization entails certain benefits. 
For instance, these groups bestow companionship, belonging and a taste of significance upon 
their members (Doosje, et al., 2016; Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, & Webber, 2017). 
Individuals within a terrorist group are intrinsically equipped with a form of collective agency 
(Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009; McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). Terrorist involvement 
can therefore be a rewarding activity by and of itself (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, 
& Webber, 2017). 
A reading of the process of becoming a terrorist as specified above bears serious 
implications. As exemplified by the term radicalization, ideology is widely thought to be a 
prerequisite for terrorist engagement (Dean, 2017; Sageman, 2017; Ferguson, 2016). Contrary 
to this household conviction, beliefs are by no means causal (Marsden, 2016; Simi, Bubolz, & 
Hardman, 2013; Lynch, 2015). Social identity serves as a key mechanism in engendering 
terrorist engagement (Sageman, 2017). If anything, ideology serves more as a tool that binds 
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the different members of the group more together in that it is something that they have in 
common. Violent ideas alone do not necessarily bring about violent behaviour. It is collective 
identification that allows for collective action (Sageman, 2017). As a result, it takes a lot more 
than gushing violent messages to convert individuals into zealous militants (Glazzard, 2017; 
Ferguson, 2016). The individual itself, the social group and the enclosing context are all vital 
constituents of the progression towards terrorism. 
  
Social Identity and Desistance from Terrorism 
Along with shaping the outset of terrorist engagement, social identification plays a 
vital part in the process of desisting from terrorism. To what extent identity has a part in 
retracting oneself from this path, however, has been far less extensively examined (Barrelle, 
2010). The following section aims to dig a little deeper into this matter. 
Terrorist involvement is exclusively called into question in the face of threat (Harris, 
2015). In this case, the threat pertains to the integrity of a person’s sense of self. Any system 
of meaning is teeming with inconsistencies that, for the most part, tend to lie dormant 
(Higgins, 1987). That is, until a shift in the situation brings these issues to the surface. The 
awareness of inconsistencies in how one perceives the world and, by extension, how one 
perceives oneself to be sparks a process of self-verification (Harris, 2015). By assessing the 
coherence of different notions about the self, individuals hope to confirm the existing views 
they hold about themselves and, subsequently, to affirm the belief that their overall sense of 
self is consistent (Harris, 2015; Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011). Self-verification can 
take the form of a profound analysis of the self (Alicke, Zell, & Guenther, 2013) or of seeking 
out self-verifying feedback from relevant others (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012). 
If the process of self-verification is unsuccessful in restoring a coherent sense of self, 
the individual typically goes through a sweeping state of self-discrepancy (Harris, 2015). The 
presence of many different levels of identity in a person’s general sense of self implies many 
different possible sources of discrepancy, and thus many different kinds of self-discrepancy. 
Contradictions among self-construals can be roughly divided into two categories: maintaining 
  
 
 
 
 
Sigrid Raets: Considering Terrorist Desistance from a Social Identity Perspective. 
 
 
 
 
17 
incompatible perceptions about the self and experiencing a violation of identity standards 
(Higgins, 1987; Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011; Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2011). The 
latter denotes a transgression of personally accepted norms or the nonfulfillment of 
meaningful desires and aspirations (Higgins, 1987). In other words, there is a glaring 
discrepancy between how people see themselves and how they imagined themselves to be 
(Marsden, 2016). These rather abstract cognitive disparities crop up in the form of feelings of 
disappointment and contempt (Higgins, 1987), as specified by the push-pull model above. 
Incidentally, self-discrepancy is connected to issues of identity salience. This manifest 
prominence of inconsistencies, seeing that they threaten the individual’s psychological 
integrity, accentuates intra-group differences over intergroup differences. Similarly, the 
group’s identity no longer matches up to the real world and, to that end, fails to meet the 
individual’s expectations. Accordingly, the social identity at issue is found lacking in terms of 
normative as well as comparative fit. As self-categorization theory predicts, a cognitive 
reshuffle could very well ensue.  
Self-discrepancy is usually accompanied by serious psychological distress (Harris, 
2015; Higgins, 1987). Having to juggle outright conflicting self-construals instigates identity 
confusion and anxious uncertainty (Amiot, de la Sablonniere, Smith, & Smith, 2015; 
McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). People simply struggle to define who they are (Gregg, 
Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011). Concisely, self-discrepancy is a horrible state of being. 
Individuals therefore seek ways to manage their faltering sense of self (Harris, 2015; 
McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). In this instance, two different threat-coping or defensive 
strategies are conceivable. One faces the dilemma of either reconciling oneself with the group 
or breaking away from the pack (Harris, 2015). When confronted with existential threat, one 
way of preserving a positive self-view is thus to restore the affiliation with the in-group 
(McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Swann & Buhrmester, 2012). This strategy is, to a 
certain degree, influenced by the ability to escape from the threat posed by a mismatched 
social identity (McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Barrelle, 2015). Cutting oneself loose 
from a terrorist group is anything but a given. Besides barriers imposed by the collectivity 
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(Harris, 2015), the individual quite possibly might have shackled him or herself to the group 
by willingly making sacrifices to acquire this particular social identity (Gregg, Sedikides, & 
Gebauer, 2011; Sageman, 2017). In order to resolve the discrepancy, one’s personal identity is 
changed so that it no longer clashes with the collective identity (Higgins, 1987). Distancing 
oneself from the group, on the contrary, implies dis-identification with the collectivity and an 
inverse rearrangement of personal and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Barrelle, 2015; 
Marsden, 2016). Terrorist discontinuance is, by its very nature, a function of identification. 
Those with low levels of identification, and correspondingly low levels of commitment, rarely 
hesitate to turn their back on the group in harsh times (Sageman, 2017). Clearly, the ties that 
bind are few and far between. As revealed by the concept of individual mobility in the theory 
of social identity, desisting from terrorism is as much a process of finding an alternative group 
as it is about departing from the erstwhile category (Marsden, 2016; Barrelle, 2015). To that 
effect, individuals engage in a process of anticipatory self-change (Alicke, Zell, & Guenther, 
2013) in conjunction with projecting personal traits onto the prospective group (Amiot, de la 
Sablonniere, Smith, & Smith, 2015). After successfully parting company from the terrorist 
group, the individual finds him or herself in a situation of identity limbo (Jenkins, 2014). The 
discontinuities between the person’s former social group and the new social category are at 
the forefront of ensuing identity processes. After a while, the different social identities are 
isolated and kept in separate compartments (Amiot, de la Sablonniere, Smith, & Smith, 2015). 
This particular frame of mind is also known as the in between worlds phenomenon (Harris, 
2015). One’s overarching sense of self is essentially composed of bits and pieces of both 
previous and new identities. To wit, no identity ever ceases to exist and no identity 
transformation is ever really finished. Identities that are as fundamental to one’s self-concept 
as being a terrorist are expected to bear long-lasting consequences (Simi, Blee, DeMichele, & 
Windisch, 2017; Bosi & Uba, 2016; Giugni, 2008). Identity residual is therefore echoed in 
momentarily lapses or flashback episodes, in consequence of deeply entrenched and habitual 
cognitive processes (Simi, Blee, DeMichele, & Windisch, 2017; Harris, 2015). Surely the 
process of desistance is not about exorcising the terrorist within. Quite the opposite is true as, 
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for the sake of anyone’s psychological well-being, the different fragments of one’s identities 
are ideally integrated into a coherent and comfortable sense of self (Jenkins, 2014; McKeown, 
Haji, & Ferguson, 2016; Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2011). It is by connecting the dots and 
drawing links that various identity segments become assimilated in the underlying self 
(Amiot, de la Sablonniere, Smith, & Smith, 2015). Paradoxically, former terrorists must first 
come to terms with their past identity before they can move forward. A compartmentalized 
self is not a coherent self and thus crosses the need for continuity, essentially perpetuating the 
prior disruption of identity (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011). In fact, this leaves a person 
vulnerable for re-engagement, as illustrated by the aforementioned identity 
motives for terrorist involvement.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This article began with uncovering the present state of research in the field of terrorist 
discontinuance. As one could expect from a field that is still in its embryonic stages, the study 
of how one comes to give up terrorist engagement is both conceptually and theoretically 
underdeveloped. The distinction between deradicalization and disengagement is notably 
pervasive in this line of enquiry, but has failed to advance our understanding of this process in 
a meaningful way. The push and pull framework, on the other hand, stands as a useful starting 
point in the interpretation of terrorist discontinuance. However, this theoretical model is at 
most a superficial account of a convoluted issue and is, accordingly, in dire need of further 
elaboration. To that end, the present article has opted to bridge the gap by introducing the 
well-established social identity approach to the process of terrorist desistance. In essence, the 
social identity perspective is of particular use in elucidating the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms of this radical transformation. Processes of social identification and self-
categorization are intrinsic to any group-related phenomenon and thus vital in making sense 
of the emergence and repudiation of terrorist involvement. As such, social identification is the 
key mechanism that drives desistance from terrorism. These processes describe what is going 
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on beneath the surface of push and pull factors and, in effect, tie this mishmash of distinctive 
arguments together. As follows, both the stages of getting involved in terrorist activity and 
stepping down from it are products of social identification. These processes are, 
unsurprisingly, related but nonetheless far from identical. Whereas terrorist engagement is 
marked by a shift in salience from more personal to more social identities, terrorist desistance 
requires the exact opposite. Joining a terrorist group revolves around perceived similarity, 
whereas leaving is grounded in the perception of fundamental differences. This means that 
when becoming part of a terrorist organization, there is a sense of continuity in terms of 
identity. Conversely, breaking away from terrorist involvement is characterized by a 
considerable discrepancy between identities. On top of the crushing psychological impact of 
leaving a part of oneself behind (Harris, 2015), desistance from terrorism is set apart by 
widely different structural opportunities in comparison to the outset of the terrorist life cycle. 
As a matter of fact, walking away from terrorism relies on processes that go beyond 
identification, specifically the notions of structure and agency (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 
2011; Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, & Webber, 2017; Barrelle, 2015). In many 
instances, the acquisition of a certain social identity is encouraged and rewarded by the group 
whereas the rejection of this identity is met with stigmatization and disdain on both sides. 
Moreover, desisting is determined by having the opportunity and necessary resources to 
withdraw from the organization (Barrelle, 2015). In sum, terrorist desistance rests on a 
distinguished interaction between processes of identity, structure and agency which, in turn, 
implies an entirely different dynamic when compared to terrorist emergence. 
The implications of these results are nothing short of far-reaching. First of all, 
examining terrorist desistance from a social identity perspective unveils both the connection 
between the individual and the group and the interweaving of a person’s mindset and 
behaviour. This interpretation of the process lies athwart of a categorical dichotomization 
between deradicalization and disengagement. Furthermore, as mentioned before, there is still 
a great deal of confusion with regard to the potential objectives of counterterrorist 
interventions and, especially, to what extent ideology should be addressed by these 
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programmes (Koehler, 2017). In point of fact, the social identity approach clearly 
demonstrates the role of ideology in the terrorist life-cycle to be more or less negligible. 
Focusing exclusively on changing beliefs is therefore of little use in preventing terrorist re-
engagement. On the other hand, given the evident connection between identity, culture and 
religion, it stands to reason that it would be a misconception to dismiss ideological issues 
altogether. The point is that religion, or any other system of meaning for that matter, is not to 
be regarded as necessarily causal in connection to terrorist involvement, but should instead be 
viewed from the context of identity in which it operates and, accordingly, approached in a 
contextualized manner. Or rather, what ought to be the focus in dealing with terrorist 
engagement is highlighting the differences between group members themselves and 
underscoring the similarity or sameness between militant individuals and the out-group 
(Gadd, 2006). In addition, more attention should be paid to supportive structures that enable 
individuals to separate themselves from a life of terrorism. Any identity has to be made to 
matter (Jenkins, 2014), yet this aspect is at present gravely overlooked. On the contrary, the 
overly repressive responses that currently dominate the counterterrorist agenda (Paulussen, 
2016; Entenmann, van der Heide, Weggemans, & Dorsey, 2015) are in blatant disregard of 
the principles of social identification. Blindly cracking down on terrorist engagement 
reinforces the image of the out-group as a threat. In the long run, any counterterrorist policy 
that offers nothing more than blunt search and destroy tactics is largely counterproductive. 
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